The Fascist Playbook IX: Dissonance or what 'One Battle After Another' Misses that Pynchon gets

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    There is perhaps a strange similarity between Antigone and the fate of the revolutionaries in Thomas Pynchon's Vineland (1990), a novel which recently acquired a second life through Paul Thomas Anderson's One Battle After Another (2025). Both works are concerned with the extraordinary difficulty of distinguishing a revolutionary subject from the conditions through which he or she becomes its opposite.  Vineland begins in California in 1984, where a certain Zoyd Wheeler, a former hippie, must perform an annual act of public insanity in order to continue receiving disability benefits. This year he has decided to wear a woman's dress and attack a bar with a chainsaw, a performance which must be witnessed by television cameras if he is to continue being recognised by the welfare state as a lunatic. Unfortunately, the bar has been gentrified, the loggers have developed expensive tastes and his entire performance has been moved by somebody else to another location. Even ...

The Fascist Playbook III-: Dissonance and how a new generation has made it the basis for revolutionary consciousness

'The strategic adversary is fascism...the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behaviour, the fascism that causes us to love power, the desire that the very thing that dominates us exploits us'

 

Michel Foucault, Preface to Anti-Oedipus

 

 

For a preface apparently written in jest this is quite a serious claim. If it were so that we all harbor such minimal fascism, then does that not precisely lead us into a realm where a person, even within a left network, might begin to exhibit signs of fascism, but perhaps even worse to a fate where the left is perpetually internally divided playing the game 'tu fascist', 'tu fascist'?

 

Here I attempt again to dispute the idea that fascism is an identity or ideology, to argue that it is a form of material semiosis that functions through certain abstract machinic traits. This poses a further problem since this blog series is specifically designed to portray fascism, which brings my question to: what about the abstract machine escapes representation? 

 

Foucault's '"Society must be defended'" of course one must minimally remember places the title for this series of lectures in quotes. This is the clearest articulation in Foucault's ouvre of an examination of nazism. 

 Foucault begins by wondering whether politics should be understood as the continuation of war. He then spends much of the course reconstructing a largely forgotten tradition of historical writing in which society is divided by conquest and perpetual struggle. Finally, he shows how this discourse of struggle undergoes a transformation, becoming associated with state racism and the biological management of populations.

We can state its central historical problem as follows:

How does a discourse that originally exposed the violence concealed beneath political sovereignty become a discourse through which the state legitimates violence against its own population?

The unfortunate outcome of this is of course that political struggles are inherently given to being coopted by state. 

Any form of political subjectivity is simply fodder for fascism. And yet the recent Delhi protests were indisputably revolutionary. The point isn't that the fascist state should fall, but rather that we create a memory of revolutionary consciousness in every generation. 

 

 

Dissonance and Memetic Language

While for Hegel the movement of consciousness itself is history, Foucault recognises interiority as historically produced around the turn of the nineteenth century. Foucault argues that the madman, for example is produced as a consciousness of unreason around this time. What we really see in the Delhi protests is an incipient revolutionary subjectivity which recognizes itself tat subjectivity is born and not pre-given.

 

I feel like an anachronistic denotational machine in comparison with Gen-Z and the elements of Gen-Z registers of speech that have entered Millennial language. What Gen-Z does is connote wildly; their language is auto-memetic. They are precise with their use of psychoanalytic linguistic markers; they define territories, and long hours spent on a social media page mean they manage incredibly well to dissociate from various relationships. Goffman gets this. Mauss doesn’t because he’s basically imitating Hegel in The Category of the Person. Memetic language is auto-revolutionary; it is an attack on human language as significatory; it launches calvacades of meaning, each word erupting from the mouth like a thing-in-itself.

 

 

 



A meme is never quite the repetition of another meme. Its existence consists in its capacity to be repeated without retaining an identical meaning, to pass from one situation to another, acquiring a different force each time. One might say that it is a language whose fundamental unit is the refrain rather than the signifier. Its repetitions establish territories, produce recognitions, attract bodies, and occasionally undo the very conditions that made them recognizable.

Guattari's distinction between signifying and a-signifying semiotics becomes especially important here. A signifying semiology organizes signs through their relation to meaning, representation, and interpretation. An a-signifying semiotics operates directly within material and social arrangements. A meme may communicate an intelligible joke, but its efficacy cannot be exhausted by explaining that joke. The same image repeated across hundreds of screens begins to organize a certain manner of speaking, looking, gesturing, and anticipating the reactions of others. One recognizes a meme before comprehending its particular variation. Its recognizability is already a practical competence. Its repetition becomes a way of occupying a territory.

Consider the Cockroach Janta Party. The cockroach begins as an imposed designation, an attempt to reduce a population to a particular identity. Yet something peculiar occurs when the designation is appropriated as a refrain. The cockroach acquires innumerable supplementary traits: it dances, sings, paints, protests, puts on costumes, and eventually appears in the streets as an embodied collective figure. We witness what Guattari calls a process of deterritorialization. A sign that previously functioned within an assemblage of humiliation begins to enter other assemblages, acquiring relations that its original enunciation could never have anticipated.

But the cockroach is also a faciality machine. Its immediately recognizable features provide a surface upon which an indefinite number of identities can be inscribed. Each variation retains enough of the cockroach to remain recognizable while modifying the relations through which it can appear. The figure proliferates across bodies, images, placards, and performances. Here the important thing is not simply that a negative stereotype has been transformed into a positive identity. That would merely reverse the signification while leaving its logic intact. Rather, the multiplication of cockroaches makes the identity itself increasingly difficult to stabilize. There is no definitive cockroach to which all the others must conform.

This brings us to Guattari's concept of redundancy. In conventional information theory, redundancy appears as the repetition of information already transmitted. For Guattari, however, repetition is itself productive. He distinguishes redundancies of resonance, through which different signs reinforce an established regime of recognition, from machinic redundancies of interaction, through which heterogeneous components enter into new operational relations. The cockroach can function in either manner. Repeated as an emblem of collective identity, it can consolidate a new territory of belonging. But when the image passes into a costume, a chant, a theatrical performance, or an improvised encounter with political authority, its recurrence may produce relations that were absent from the original image.

A meme is therefore not inherently revolutionary. The same mechanisms that permit its proliferation can also produce conformity, compulsive repetition, and new forms of collective subjection. A refrain may become a black hole around which every utterance is compelled to circulate. The political question concerns the capacity of repetition to generate new connections rather than merely securing an already established identity.

The importance of memetic language lies in its capacity to interrupt such redundancies of signification. A sign can be repeated in a manner that alters the conditions of its own recognition. The accusation can become absurd; the insult can become a costume; the identity can proliferate until it is no longer capable of enclosing the bodies to which it was assigned.

Perhaps revolutionary consciousness is precisely this peculiar experience of a collective discovering that the signs through which it has been constituted do not exhaust what it can become. The cockroach continues multiplying, producing new gestures, new encounters, new territories. The exterminator, meanwhile, is left explaining the joke.

 

Dissonance and Ephemeral Subjectivity

Let us return once more to the game 'tu fascist' 'tu fascist'. Even here on will have to admit the potential of revolutionary consciousness is alive. In many modern urban and humanities leaning groups, charges of political consciousness form a major part of the deepest roots of friends groups. At any point political consciousness can knock you out of the group on charge of being a fascist or on the other side charges of being revolutionary in a right oriented group. 

While such games as well as territories of psychonalaytic and psychiatric language to measure subjectivity: ragebatiing, gaslighting etc. All these territories of subjectivity are however inherently fragile and I would like to conclude by arguing fundamentally revolutinary. 

Dissonance in modern incipient subjectivity is the basis for its revolutionary capacity. 

The extraordinary thing about these new territories of subjectivity is that they can be constituted and dissolved almost instantaneously. A friendship can become an ideological antagonism through a single utterance, just as an accusation can become ridiculous through its repetition as a meme. The subject who was a fascist yesterday may become a revolutionary tomorrow, without either designation exhausting the conditions of their existence. Dissonance is precisely this inability of subjectivity to coincide with the identities through which it is recognized. Its revolutionary capacity lies in the fragility of every apparatus that attempts to make such recognition permanent. The subject is perpetually escaping its own designation.


 

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